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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to address a theoretical and empirical gap within terrorism studies, and more specially
the study of terrorist-group lethality. This research updates a model of terrorist-group lethality by
including terrorist-leader psychology as an individual-level variable in predicting terrorist-group lethality.
Terrorist-leader statements were analyzed by using two novel coding schemes called Operational Code
and Leadership Trait Analysis to create quantified measurements of leader cognitive beliefs and
personality traits. The empirical portion of this study utilizes pooled cross-sectional time-series data
within the framework of fixed effects and multi-level estimation models. The results find that terroristleader psychology, and more specifically Instrumental (Strategic) Beliefs and Distrust, are significant
predictors of subsequent group-lethality.
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ADDRESSING A GAP IN TERRORISM STUDIES

Introduction

A modern and parsimonious definition of terrorism has yet to achieve a well agreed upon
status within the literature on terrorist violence. Scholars have debated that terrorism must be of a
random or indiscriminate nature, so to cause fear in individual members of a target audience or
out-group (Jongman, 2005; Kalyvas, 2004), while others have said that terrorism can be highly
discriminate or a mixture of both discriminate and random violence (Crenshaw, 1981). Another
issue with a comprehensive definition of terrorism is the identity of the perpetrator. Terrorism,
and subsequently, terrorist violence, is correctly classified as a tactic that can be utilized by both
states, and a variety of sub-state actors (Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur & Alexander, 1978). This
study is interested in the latter, sub-state groupings, that conduct terrorism, with the author’s
description of terrorism being defined as the intentional application of, or threat of violence for
political or social purposes, through the intimidation of a larger audience (Hoffman, 2006;
Sandler & Enders, 2007), and the strategic targeting of civilians or government affiliated noncombatants (Stanton, 2013; Wilson & Piazza, 2013). This definition is more supportive of the
notion that terrorism can have both a discriminate and indiscriminate outcome, with special
emphasis on the conditions of intentional and strategic violence.
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The definition provided above separates the act of terrorism from other types of violence
(criminal, interpersonal, psychotic, war, etc), and also allows the inclusion of discriminate uses
of violent behavior (targeted killings, assassination, etc.) against civilians and government
affiliated non-combatants. The theoretical interest of this study concerns the role of the leaders
within these sub-state organizations, with the substantive research question addressed by this
study being: Does the psychology of terrorist-leaders affect the lethality of terrorist-group
violence?
It is apparent that the lethality of terrorist violence committed by terrorist organizations
has a considerable degree of variance (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; LaFree, 2010). So far the study
of terrorist violence lethality has focused mostly on organizational mechanisms that cause
specific groups to be more deadly than others (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008). Much of the
scholarship has focused on material mechanisms that influence violence levels, but there is some
scholarship that addresses psychology as a potential explanatory variable. These studies address
questions such as what causes individuals to pursue political violence (Crenshaw, 1986), and if
psychology can predict when terrorists will use violence (Hermann & Sakiev, 2011; Walker,
2011). Other studies have shown that terrorist leaders are distinct in their operational codes from
normal political leaders (Lazarevska, Sholl, & Young, 2006).
It has been shown that capabilities and ideology are empirically important predictors of
lethality amongst terrorist organizations (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Hoffman, 1995, 2006;
Piazza, 2009). These studies have been well received and are in fact quite intuitive as will be
discussed in the coming literature review. It should be clear that this study does not seek to
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invalidate previous hypotheses concerning the lethality of terrorist-group behavior, but to try and
take into account potentially salient individual level variables when studying terrorist-group
lethality. Neither the individual group members nor leaders are deemed as possible explanations
for variable outcomes in lethality compared to material capability or group ideology (Crenshaw,
1992). While other studies have looked at terrorist-leader psychology (Hermann & Sakiev, 2011;
Picucci, 2008; Walker, 2011), they have not addressed the specific question of the lethality of
violence. The objective of bridging the psychology gap in terrorist violence research is clear. If
written and verbal material can be used to better understand terrorist violence, then not only is it
important for objective academic scholarship but it is also of possible importance to real world
tools for counter-terrorism.
The organization of this paper is detailed as follows. Firstly, a brief but thorough
literature review will examine the current trends and advances in terrorist scholarship on the
topic of violence. Secondly, a theory of terrorist leadership and its effect on group behavior is
established by examining the role of leadership, capabilities, and ideology on terrorist-group
violent behavior. Thirdly, this paper details the methodology used in the collection of data and
the operationalization of the variables that measure leader psychology, group capabilities, and
group ideology. Lastly, the results of an empirical study are discussed alongside conclusions and
implications about the results.

3

TERRORIST VIOLENCE WITHIN THE LITERATURE

Scholarly work on terrorism has borrowed from psychology for most of its existence in
the area of social science (Crenshaw, 1986; Hoffman, 2006). Early research focused on
pathological issues within individuals who commit terrorism. The paradigm of attributing
terrorist actors to the likes of psychopathic political killers was both subjectively driven and
scientifically flawed (Post, 2007). Criticism of this paradigm’s ability to objectively understand
political radicalization towards violence and also to normatively create solutions to such
problems would lead to new schools of thought that emphasized the thesis that terrorists are
actually acting in normal and rational ways (Crenshaw, 2007; Krueger, 2008; Post, 2007, 2010).
With this renaissance of terrorism scholarship, the topics studied became increasingly diversified
to the point that it has become in essence a single discipline as opposed to a sub-field of various
behavioral schools (sociology, behavioral economics, political science, social psychology).
A simplistic approach to understanding the current trends within terrorism research can
be divided into three main competing schools of thought. These are the rational actor/materialist
models, the social/cultural models, and the psychological models of terrorist action and
radicalization (Crenshaw, 1992). With a new emphasis on theory competition and more rigorous
methodologies, terrorism studies have addressed a plethora of interesting and important
questions regarding terrorism with the most obvious question being: What exactly is a terrorist
(Crenshaw, 1992; Hoffman, 2006; Smelser, 2009)? Another widely studied topic within
terrorism studies is that of terrorist-group behavior, and more specifically terrorist-group
4

violence outcomes (Crenshaw, 1987, 2007). The topic of terrorist violence is of importance to
this study and from here onward this paper will discuss the current trends within the field that
address issues of violence.
Terrorist Violence: A Topic Divided

If scholars have trouble agreeing on the origins of radicalization and the logic of terrorist
action, then it should be expected that this debate is also relevant to the issue of terrorist violence
lethality. There are three main arguments within the lethality debate which each bring some
insight into the variance of lethality between terrorist organizations. These theories contend that
capability, rational strategy, and ideology all play a role in determining lethality outcomes.
Another and more recent development is the idea that individual psychology might play a role in
violence levels (Hermann & Sakiev, 2011; Walker, 2011). While the literature continues debate
on the main mechanisms that enable lethality, it does agree that terrorist organizations do show a
degree of variance in how lethal they make their violent actions (Enders & Sandler, 2000, 2002;
Gunaratna, 2013; LaFree, 2012).
Rational Actor Model

One intuitive response to previous notions about terrorist irrationality was the notion that
like all actors, terrorists will act rationally to maximize their gains and to maintain their relative
capabilities (Shughart & William, 2011). Violence is seen as a mechanism that is rationally used
5

against targets for strategic purposes (Kydd & Walter, 2006; Pape, 2003a). Terrorist
organizations use violence as a form of costly signaling towards target states and perceived
constituencies (Kydd & Walter, 2006). The rationality behind variable levels of lethality comes
from the dilemma that terrorist organizations face when combating states in an asymmetrical
fashion. Terrorist organizations want to use the “correct” level of violence in which to influence
concessions (Krueger, 2008). The rational terrorist decision maker will curb the level of violence
to a point in which the costs suffered by their targets is enough to influence concessions
(Behlendorf, Lafree, & Legault, 2012; Frey, Luechinger, & Stutzer, 2007; Krueger, 2008) but not
enough to push their target state into a corner they must fight out of or to alienate their perceived
support base (Crenshaw, 2007; Gould & Klor, 2010; Krueger, 2008).
Another group of rational choice scholars takes a more nuanced approach when studying
terrorist violence. These studies acknowledge that there are variable individual components of
terrorist organizations. This updated theory addressed the question of why certain organizations
will use violence to spoil possible concessions (Kydd & Walter, 2006). Moderate members of
such groups will use violence until moderate concessions can be issued in return and extreme
members of organizations will view moderate concessions as being a loss of utility1 (Bueno de
Mesquita, 2005; Kydd & Walter, 2006). These extremist organizations have a higher threshold
for utility when it comes to concessions and will logically continue violent action in an
asymmetrical conflict and will often ramp up the level of violence (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005). In
fact, for this model it is more logical for terrorist organizations to increase the level of violence as a
1

This approach is more intuitive than the standard rational actor model. Most terrorism scholars would agree that a
pure rational actor model cannot generally predict the strategy of all terrorist organizations and that different groups
should have at least variable utility functions depending on their idiosyncratic context.
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mechanism to invite disproportionate response from the target state (Lake, 2002; Newman, 2012). Here,
terrorist organizations prefer extreme levels of violence in an effort to indirectly radicalize their
constituent populations. Higher thresholds of violence can also be used as a tool to outbid competing
groups for the support of the population 2 (Kydd & Walter, 2009; Lake, 2002; Nemeth, 2013).
Organizational Capabilities

In the area of capability studies there is some overlap with rational expectations, but it is
unique enough to warrant attention here. The capabilities argument states that much of the
variance in level of lethality from terrorist attacks is attributed to organizational capability.
Rational choice overlaps with this argument when power differentials are at play. More capable
groups have the ability to push violence thresholds without fearing a loss of utility from state
counter actions (Frisch, 2012; Gould & Klor, 2010). These are often characterized as
insurgencies who often legitimately compete with the state for control over territory and
resources (Frisch, 2012; Hoffman, 2006). Even smaller groups that have lower organizational
capability are capable of sustained violent action when state institutions lack the ability to
coordinate appropriate responses against terrorist groups (Brands, 2011). Another component is
the intersection of terrorist organizations and criminal organizations (Cornell, 2008; Shelley et
al., 2005). Cooperation with criminal groups can increase organizational capabilities through
funding, training, and adoption of new strategies (Picarelli, 2012).

2

Outbidding in this sense does not mean that these groups use violence to compete with the state for popular support
but to use more violence than competing terrorist/social organizations. For example: If group A attacks target enemy
more often and more lethally then potential popular support will gravitate towards group A.
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Perhaps the most convincing study on organizational capabilities and terrorist lethality
comes from research on the effects of group level capabilities on group lethality (Asal &
Rethemeyer, 2008; Asal et al., 2009). Asal and Rethemeyer found that group size, degree of
territorial control, and number of alliances were the most important organizational indicators of
increased lethality 3 (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008). Other studies have shown support for the
influence of group power and capabilities on lethality of attacks. Groups that increase in size and
experience were shown to not only produce more lethal attacks but also to be more frequent in
their attacks 4 (Clauset & Gleditsch, 2012; Clauset & Wiegel, 2010). When groups are able to
attract a larger and more diverse set of recruits, there is a higher probability of gaining both high
quality recruits, and the ability to transfer this expertise will also increase over time (Clauset &
Gleditsch, 2012). As one would expect with a legitimate military organization, increases in
manpower, experience, and material capabilities increase the ability to inflict damage.
Ideology

Ideology is an integral component of much terrorism scholarship and often overlaps with
psychological models of terrorism strategy and violence (Crenshaw, 1986, 1987; Hoffman,
2006). Like the argument for capabilities, the research on the connection between ideology and
level of violence seeks to improve upon generalizing rational choice model of terrorism by using
individual group differences as explanatory variables for lethality outcomes. Early research by
3

The significance of these findings is in relation to other hypothesized mechanisms. The authors found that these
three components were better predictors of lethality than state support, organization age, and host country status.
4
It should be pointed out that Asal & Rethemeyer found that organization age was not a significant indicator of
lethality in opposition to Clauset’s finding that it is. This could be the production of methodology differences but it
does indicate that the variance caused by capabilities of groups is still up for debate.
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Hoffman conceptualized ideology as having a direct connection with the level of violence that
terrorist-groups would be willing to engage with (Hoffman, 2006). Leftist groups were seen as
the least likely to commit highly lethal attacks because they prefer to engage discriminate and
targeted action against perceived criminals of the state or the market. Ethno-nationalist/separatist
groups fit within the category mentioned before by rational choice theorists. These groups seek a
“tolerable” level of violence that destabilizes the state but does not alienate the support base. The
third ideology type is religious/fundamentalist groups. These groups were predicted to be the
most indiscriminate and committed the most violence in their actions because the tool of violent
served as a mechanism of creating a “paradise outcome” 5 (Hoffman, 1995).
In recent quantitative research there has been empirical support for the idea that religious
ideologies cause terrorist groups to become more lethal. Going back to the organization research
that was written by Asal & Rethemeyer (2009), it was found that religious groups were more
likely to cause more casualties. Leftist groups were at the lowest end of lethality with nationalistseparatist groups sitting in the middle, just as Hoffman hypothesized (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008;
Hoffman, 2006). Some empirical research also indicates that ideology may be a consistent factor
in determining what kind of targets terrorist-groups attack and how lethal those attacks might be
(Asal et al., 2009; Wright, 2013), with religious groups typically being more likely to target
civilians and non-combatants with more lethal violence. While ideology has gained some
empirical support, there is still debate on whether religious groups really are more lethal. In a
study on the effect of ideology’s role in terrorist lethality, James Piazza (2009) found that Islamic

5

For some religious groups the annihilation of perceived enemies in both the physical and ideological realm is
inherently a part of their political objectives.
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based groups differed in objectives and subsequently varied in the lethality of their violence 6
(Piazza, 2009). It was found that there are statistical and qualitative differences between AlQae’da and other Islamic terrorist organizations. Piazza found that Al-Qae’da and Al-Qae’da
affiliate organizations were more likely to show increased lethality in their violence compared to
other Islamic oriented terrorist organizations (e.g. Hamas, Hezbullah, etc.), and when controlling
for only Al-Qae’da and Al-Qae’da affiliates, Islamic terrorist organizations were not statistically
likely to be more lethal than other types of terrorist-groups. This indicates that while ideology
continues to be a salient characteristic of terrorist organizations, it should be expected that for
some ideological groupings there is a degree of qualitative difference between likeminded
groups.
Psychological Model(s)

The literature that has been examined so far has been diverse yet shares a common
assumption. These trends have examined terrorist violence as a behavior that is motivated from
the top-down, meaning that their actions are driven by the structure of the environment around
the individual. Psychological theories of terrorist violence examine the opposite end of this idea
by focusing on individual factors that lead to violence 7 (Victoroff, 2005). While it is clear that
both top down and bottom up approaches to examining behavior outcomes give valuable insight
into the level of violence, it is often the case that these two approaches are intertwined
6

Piazza also found that many Islamic/Religious groups were better characterized as nationalist-separatist groups.
This means that the coding and conceptualization of group ideologies in the BAAD data used by Asal and
Rethemeyer was potentially flawed.
7
As noted earlier, many of the top down approaches use elements of psychological theory but still maintain the
primacy of structural conditions on the actions of the agent.
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academically and possibly rightly so (Crenshaw, 2002). The main difference for scholars who
choose to adopt psychological models is that group-level models are often underspecified even
when borrowing from psychological theories 8 (Crenshaw, 2002).
The classic psychological model is that of psychoanalytic theory. These scholars used
identity theory, narcissism theory, and paranoia theory alongside a framework of dynamics (adult
psychology), phenomenology (action), and genesis (formation) (Kernberg, 2003a; Victoroff,
2005). Previous studies came to the conclusion that young people who resorted to political
violence were seeking to create a stable identity or trying to procure an element of self-worth
(Crenshaw, 1986; Olsson, 1988; Taylor & Quayle, 1994). Another source of terrorist violence is
the potential for narcissistic rage that fuels hatred at a perceived object of humiliation (Akhtar,
1999; Crayton, 1983). The last segment of psychoanalytic explanations for violence is that of
psychopathological paranoia. These individuals who exhibit paranoia tendencies use their
distrust of perceived enemies to justify violent actions (Post, 1990, 2007). While these theories
are based in rich academic traditions reaching back to Freud and Erickson, they are hard to test
and examine objectively (Victoroff, 2005). In the light of these problems more contemporary
theories have sought to examine emotion and cognition.
Two important developments in contemporary psychology have been underutilized in
terrorism studies: these are cognitive theory and emotion. Cognition refers to an individual’s way
of thinking that includes biases, prejudices, and tendencies (Victoroff, 2005). A highly cited
psychological variable in studying terrorist violence is the idea of cognitive capacity/complexity.
8

The prime example is that of rational choice theory. Rational choice takes into account individual utility but
simultaneously assumes that all individuals rationally gravitate towards the strategy that will maximize their
outcomes.
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Evidence has shown that lower levels of cognitive capacity are correlated with behavior that is
aggressive and violent (Bryant, 1984; Victoroff, 2005). This idea of lower cognitive capacity
leading to violence is also evident in political leadership studies (Post, 2003; Satterfield, 1998;
Schafer & Walker, 2006). In relation to the topic of this study, there has been interesting
applications of Leadership Trait Analysis and Operational Code to predicting terrorist violence
(Hermann & Sakiev, 2011; Walker, 2011). Both studies found that measureable cognitive traits
varied before and after violent behavior. Another trend deals with the fundamental nature of
emotional reasoning in terrorist violence. Humiliation of an individual and the connected desire
for revenge are potential predictors of violence (Stern, 2003; Victoroff, 2005). Scientific research
has supported these claims by showing that individuals generally derive emotional satisfaction
through punishing those they believe to have violated social norms even at great cost to
themselves (De Quervain et al., 2004).
The final aspect of contemporary psychological approaches to studying terrorist violence
is that of the group process. Studies examining policy makers have shown that both the
individual and the process of the group play a role in decision outcomes. Many scholars also
acknowledge that terrorism is a significant group process (Crenshaw, 1986; Hoffman, 2006;
Post, 2010; Victoroff, 2005). Membership in a terrorist organization is thought to free individuals
from normative prohibitions on violence through a collective identity that alleviates the
individual from blame when attacking the out-group (Crenshaw, 1986; Eubank & Weinberg,
1994; Hacker, 1983). It is also theorized that the influence of individual factors and group
factors on violence is varied in the context of the situation (Friedland, 1992; Kernberg, 2003a,
2003b). Leadership psychology, individual member psychology, and the objectives/ideologies of
12

the group all affect the group process towards violence, and influence a coherent and collective
view on violence towards the out-group (Crenshaw, 1986; Kernberg, 2003a).
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THEORETICAL APPROACH

This study is grounded within the idea that terrorist leadership psychology can help
explain organization lethality. Terrorist organizations could be studied in a similar fashion of a
state, in the way that national leaders have an influence on state behavior. This is reasonable
because many sub-national groups do exhibit some form of leadership function within the
organization. Studies have also shown that the leadership function within terrorist organizations
could be more important than what was previously believed in academia (Jordan, 2009; Price,
2012). Price found that groups whose leaders were targeted and killed by counter-terrorism
actions were significantly more likely to become less durable over time (Price, 2012). Other
theoretical work that addresses the psychology of the group states that leaders will often set up
the cognitive disposition that the group will commonly hold (Crenshaw, 1986). Further evidence
posits that this common cognitive adaption is a survival mechanism that influences retention and
loyalty of individual members (Mullins & Dolnik, 2009).
Terrorist Leadership and the Group

The group identity becomes a salient part of the individual’s perception through the
values imparted by the leadership of a terrorist organization (Crenshaw, 2013; Post, 1990). There
is considerable debate within terrorism scholarship about the actual utility of studying the leader
within these organizations. The concerns with studying leaders are that many groups tend to
follow the paradigm of leaderless resistance, and that the idea or goal is the most important
14

motivator of becoming active in political violence (Rapoport, 2001). This study acknowledges
that many groups do follow a leaderless or networked organization structure, but that does not
mean all groups are organized this way. Much scholarship has been dedicated to studying why
terrorist leaders are essential components of group behavior and outcomes (Hermann & Sakiev,
2011; Price, 2012; Rapoport, 2001; Walker, 2011).
Leaderless networks and lone wolf terrorists have trouble creating and maintaining a
cohesive strategy against their targets (Crenshaw, 1987; Rapoport, 2001). Other research found
that terrorist violence is also affected by the loss of a leader (Jordan, 2009; Mannes, 2008). In
terms of recruitment and retention, it is theorized that the leader has a role in cementing a
common cognitive disposition throughout the membership of a terrorist group that helps to create
a sense of cohesion and loyalty (Crenshaw, 1986). Other research has built off of the leadership
loss literature by explaining the strategic value of having a leader in the group. Terrorist leaders
commonly set the ideological and strategic disposition towards an opponent (Crenshaw, 1986;
Locicero & Sinclair, 2008). Terrorist leaders also make important group-level decisions that
affect funding and logistic support towards member operations (Geltzer, 2011; Shapiro, 2007).
In terms of violent action and lethality, there has been limited study on the influence of terrorist
leaders. In previous examinations of leader speeches and statements, it was found that the
psychology of leaders changed prior to attack periods and that this pattern was consistent over
time (Hermann & Sakiev, 2011; Walker, 2011). This means that what the leader is saying
publicly might be indicative of the group’s violent behavior.

15

A Leadership-Based Model of Terrorist-Group Lethality

Regardless of the importance of the terrorist leader within the terrorist organization, it is
still only one element that affects the violent behavior of terrorist groups. This study specifies an
updated model of the mechanisms which influence group attack lethality. As discussed in the
literature review it is apparent that both ideology and group capability affect the lethality of
terrorist attacks (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Clauset & Gleditsch, 2012; Hoffman, 2006; Piazza,
2009). This study proposes a model that includes the individual level psychology of terrorist
leaders as an essential mechanism that affects attack lethality. Figure 1 below details the model
proposed:
Group Component

Behavior Outcome

Leader
Psychology

Group
Capability

Lethality
Outcomes

Group
Ideology

Figure 1 A Model of Group Lethality
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The group lethality model is simple yet it addresses a key gap in current scholarship
concerning terrorist violence lethality. It adds the individual leaders of groups which is an
improvement over previous models that only include material and broad ideological variables.
This model is also the first quantitative study of terrorist leader psychology and its effect on the
lethality of violence. In reality, the group components of the model are most likely influencing
each other as well. This relationship between leader psychology and group ideology and
capabilities might be an interesting topic for future study but for the sake of this study and its
question the model will remain a simple theory of the mechanisms which influence violence
lethality.
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ASSESSING LEADER PSYCHOLOGY

If it is established that both the leaders of terrorist groups and their psychological
characteristics are important, then the question that is left is: how can the psychology of terrorist
leaders be studied? Scholarship within political psychology and foreign policy decision making
is helpful in examining the role of leaders in the context of policy outcomes (Post, 2003; Schafer
& Walker, 2006; Snyder, 1962). Two programs that have come out of contemporary scholarship
are Operational Code “OpCode” (Leites, 1951; Walker, Schafer, & Young, 1998) and
Leadership Trait Analysis “LTA” (Hermann, 2005). Both programs analyze speech material
through coding schemes that create cognitive and personality variables for the individual who
spoke or wrote those words.
In the realm of terrorism studies these programs have been seldom used. Both Walker
and Hermann used their programs with mixed results in an attempt to predict patterns of violence
based off speech material (Hermann & Sakiev, 2011; Walker, 2011). Both studies found that
psychology changed from group to group and from pre to post attack periods. Another study
used both LTA and OpCode measurements of both national leaders and terrorist leaders and
found that the groups were statistically distinct from each other (Lazarevska et al., 2006).
Overall, OpCode and LTA have had some success in answering questions within terrorism
studies.

18

Operational Code

Operational Code examines the basic cognitive disposition of the individual being studied
(Schafer & Walker, 2006; Walker et al., 1998). These measurements are separated into five
philosophical beliefs and five instrumental beliefs (Schafer & Walker, 2006; Walker et al.,
1998). The first philosophical belief (P1) examines how the individual perceives the nature of the
political universe by stating whether it is hostile or friendly. The second philosophical belief (P2)
examines how an individual views the eventual realization of their values and aspirations by
giving measurements indicating optimism or pessimism in respect to these values and
aspirations. The third philosophical belief (P3) gives a measurement of how an individual views
the predictability of the future. The fourth philosophical belief (P4) gives a measurement of how
an individual feels about their control over historical development and their ability to shape
developments. The fifth and last philosophical belief (P5) measures how one views the role of
“chance” in human affairs and historical development.
The first instrumental belief (I1) examines the strategic orientation of the individual and
whether they adopt a cooperative or competitive disposition. The second instrumental belief (I2)
measures how an individual believes in pursuing a goal most effectively. The third instrumental
belief (I3) measures how an individual calculates, controls, and accepts the risks within political
action. The fourth instrumental belief (I4) shows how an individual views the best “timing” of
action to advance their interests. The fifth and last instrumental belief (I5) examines how an
individual views the utility and role of different strategies for advancing their political interests.
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The cognitive dispositions of a terrorist leader should be indicative of group belief and
behavior (Crenshaw, 1986). As stated earlier in this paper, terrorist leaders can help determine
the psychological characteristics of the group by advancing beliefs about the out-group and how
the group should pursue political goals (Crenshaw, 1986; Kernberg, 2003b). The idea that
terrorist leaders shape group psychology lends itself well to operational code by connecting
group behavior with leader psychology. These beliefs can be measured by using the first
philosophical and the first instrumental variables detailed earlier in this section. These main
variables are key indicators the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of individuals (Schafer &
Walker, 2006).
Philosophical Beliefs

Walker and Schafer define philosophical beliefs as “What is the essential nature of
political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the
fundamental character of one’s political opponents?”(Walker et al., 1998). Individuals who
view the political environment around them as being conflictual, will most likely be pessimistic
about achieving political goals, view the future as being less predictable, view themselves as
having less control over historical development, and assign a higher role to chance (Walker et al.,
1998). Likewise, individuals who view conflict as less of a fixture of the political environment
are more likely to be optimistic about achieving goals, and will view themselves as having more
control over historical development (Walker et al., 1998).
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Terrorist leaders and members are characterized as individuals who have decided that
conflict is the only available or even appropriate choice in pursuing political goals (Bueno de
Mesquita, 2005; Kernberg, 2003a, 2003b; Lawrence, 2010). Individuals who choose to pursue
violent terrorist behavior see the environment and the actors around them as competitive
opponents (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Kydd & Walter, 2006; Kydd & Walter, 2009; Nemeth,
2013). This research indicates that groups will escalate violent behavior in an effort to increase
their competitiveness against the state or rival sub-state political actors. Philosophical beliefs
lead to the first hypothesis posited by this study:

H1: As terrorist leaders view the world as being more conflictual (P1), the lethality of terrorist
violence will increase.
Terrorist-leaders with a more conflictual philosophical disposition will cause the group to
increase the lethality of terrorist violence. If a leader feels that the competition represented by
rival organizations or the state directly threatens the goals of their organization, the group will
seek to raise the lethality of violence as a means of rising above the competition (Crenshaw,
1986, 1991).
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Instrumental Beliefs

Walker and Schafer define Instrumental Beliefs as “What is the best approach for
selecting goals or objectives for political action?”(Walker et al., 1998). Instrumental beliefs are
intrinsically related to an individual’s philosophical beliefs (Walker et al., 1998). Leaders who
are optimistic about the political environment about them will most likely believe that strategy
should be limited in scope, that tactics should be flexible, and risks should be calculated and
conservative (Walker et al., 1998). Leaders who are optimistic about the political universe are
likely to create grand strategic goals, have inflexible tactics, and accept large risks (Walker et al.,
1998). Instrumental beliefs lead to the second hypothesis posited by this study:

H2: As terrorist leaders become more competitive in strategy (I1), the lethality of terrorist
violence increases.
The second hypothesis examines how a terrorist leader’s strategic orientation affects
violence. If a leader decides that competitive behavior is the best way to pursue political goals
then the groups violent behavior is likely to escalate (Kydd & Walter, 2006; Pape, 2003b). On
the other hand, if the leader determines that a more cooperative strategy or a shift towards nonviolent or purely political strategies are the best way to reach political goals then the group
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should show a decline in violent behavior as its members begin to adopt this change in strategic
orientation.
Coding and Operationalization

Both Philosophical Belief (P1) and Instrumental Belief (I1) are created by using the
Verbs in Context System (VICS). VICS examines six attributes for the verbs used in the
analyzed in the verbal content. These attributes are subject, verb category, domain of politics,
tense of the verb, intended target, and the context (Schafer & Walker, 2006). Verbs that do not
have a political meaning or fail to fit in any of the six categories are coded as neutral and
discarded (Schafer & Walker, 2006). Both belief variables are created by taking the balance
between the frequency of negative and positive verbs used by an individual. This means that the
coded measurement of both variables are created by subtracting the total number of negative
verbs from the total number of positive verbs and then dividing the subtracted number by the
total number of negative and positive verbs coded in the document (Schafer & Walker, 2006)
The resulting measurement is best understood as a point within a continuum from
positive one to negative one with zero being completely mixed. For Philosophical Belief, a
positive one would represent that the individual views the political universe as being very
friendly and a negative one would indicate that the individual views the political universe as very
hostile. For Instrumental Belief, a positive one would indicate that the individual views a
cooperative direction is the best strategy, and a negative one would indicate that the individual
views a competitive direction as the best strategy (Schafer & Walker, 2006).
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Leadership Trait Analysis

Leadership Trait Analysis measures personality traits through text and verbal analysis
(Hermann, 2005). Belief in the ability to control events (BACE) measures how the individual
perceives his or her own ability to influence events. Need for Power (PWR) measurements
indicate individual concern for maintaining or creating power and influence. Conceptual
complexity (CC) indicates how an individual perceives ambiguity in the environment around
them. Self-confidence (SC), measures how an individual perceives self-importance or ability to
cope with the environment around them. Motivation for seeking office (TASK) indicates
whether an individual moves a group towards completion of tasks or focuses on building
relationships. Distrust of others (DIST) measures feelings of doubt and wariness in other and
others actions. Lastly, In-group bias (IGB) measures the degree with which the individual holds
his or her own group as being prominent within the environment.
The personality measurements that are used for hypotheses three through four were
chosen because they represent traits that are increasingly cited within terrorism scholarship
(Victoroff, 2005). Of the LTA traits discussed above, four of them stand out within the literature
(Crayton, 1983; Kernberg, 2003b; Post, 2010; Victoroff, 2005). Self-confidence, need for power
and influence, distrust of others, and in-group bias are commonly cited as psychological
mechanisms that influence an individual to pursue violence. The section below defines and
analyzes each of these four traits in the context of Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis and then
connects these traits to the terrorism psychology literature.
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Self-confidence

Hermann defines Self-Confidence as: “one’s sense of self-importance, an individual’s
image of his or her ability to cope adequately with objects and persons in the
environment.”(Hermann, 2005). Self-confidence measures how an individual perceives his or
her self within the context of the environment around them (Hermann, 2005). Self-confidence is
scored by examining first person pronouns within the individual’s verbal material. The pronoun
is coded as indicating self-confidence when the individual refers to themselves as instigating an
activity, being an authority figure or when the individual is being the recipient of positive
responses from another person or group (Hermann, 2005). Self-confidence is operationalized by
calculating the percentage times the personal pronoun is coded as indicating self-confidence.

Individuals or leaders with high self-confidence accept the environment around them and
are generally more satisfied with their status and their position. Individuals with low selfconfidence are susceptible to the changes of the context within their surrounding environment.
They seek out information that will help inform on ways to increase their status or how to adapt
to the changes within the environment. Individuals with low self-confidence often seek to
become members of political groups in an effort to enhance their self-perception (Hermann,
2005). This trait leads to the third hypothesis posited by this study:
H3: As terrorist-leader self-confidence decreases, the lethality of terrorist violence increases.
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Self-confidence plays a salient role in individual radicalization and the choice to pursue
political violence (Borowitz, 2005; Kaplan, 1978). Terror Management Theory posits that
perceived and real humiliation, domination, and injustice threaten the self-confidence of
individuals (Greenberg et al., 1990; Pyszczynski, Rothschild, & Abdollahi, 2008). The resulting
damage to self-confidence can lead to individual or collective acts of violence against an “evil”
out-group as a mechanism for dealing with the damaged self-confidence (Bar‐Tal, 2001;
Pyszczynski et al., 2008). Leaders’ with low self-confidence should influence increased group
violence behavior from their respective organizations. Having this damaged self-confidence
creates what can appear to be highly irrational and lethal violent action against their enemies
(Bar‐Tal, 2001). While this escalation of violence may seem irrational to the outside observer, it
is self-perceived as strategic behavior that not only helps to improve the self-confidence of an
individual leader but also that of the group as a whole (Greenberg, Arndt, Kruglanski, Higgins,
& van Lange, 2011; Nagl, Amos, Sewall, & Petraeus, 2008).
Need for Power and Influence

Hermann defines Need for Power and Influence as “A concern for establishing,
maintaining, or restoring one’s power.”(Hermann, 2005). Leadership trait analysis scores this
trait by finding statements that display strong and forceful action, advice or assistance when it is
not solicited, attempts to regulate another person or group, attempts to persuade, bribe, or argue,
endeavors to impress or gain fame, and when an individual is concerned with reputation or
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position (Hermann, 2005). The operationalization of this trait is created by taking the percentage
of times a verb is used in the contexts stated above.
Leaders with a high need for power and influence are generally motivated to want to
manipulate the environment around them. These leaders are skilled at sizing up situations and
also have a good perception of appropriate tactics for these situations. They also tend to also
pursue goals at any cost, often with little regard for members of their in-group. To keep power
within their respective organizations, these leaders strive to create a strong sense of conformity
within their in-group that will ensure the adherence of group members to the ideals espoused by
the leader and the organization (Hermann, 2005). This emphasis on conformity is often
combined with a highly charismatic leadership that can create highly loyal subordinates
(Hermann, 2005) A high need for power will also cause leaders to push the boundaries of a
course of action, which often results in a misjudgment of their political opponents (Hermann,
2005).
Need for power is a commonly cited motivation within terrorist psychology research.
Individuals can be motivated to join terrorist organizations or pursue political violence because
they crave self-glorification or an improvement in the social or political positions they find
themselves occupying (Cottee & Hayward, 2011). Terrorists pursue violence as a means of
advancing their self-narrative, which includes a pursuit of glory and power, by rejecting the
legitimate political and social forces that deny the individual’s ability to gain power and
influence (Cottee & Hayward, 2011; Post, 1990). This trait leads to the fourth hypothesis posited
by this study:
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H4: As terrorist-leader need for power and influence increases, the lethality of terrorist violence
increases.
An individual with a high need for power create narratives which can promote aggression
against the source of a perceived insult or roadblock to self-gratification (Bushman &
Baumeister, 1998). Terrorist-leaders create similar idealized narrative which targets the source of
threat and insult to the leader and his or her organization that is passed down to the members of a
terrorist organization. A high need for power can also escalate the level of terrorist violence as
terrorist-leaders seek to influence and out compete the actors which represent power rivalries
either at the sub-national level or within the state (Kydd & Walter, 2009). As stated before, a
leader with a high need for power will also often push the boundaries of a course of action
(Hermann, 2005). This means that the perceived irrational escalation of violence lethality against
the state could be indicative of a terrorist leader who has misjudged how far their organization
can feasibly test the limits of their ability to extract concessions from a target state (Bueno de
Mesquita, 2005; Crenshaw, 1991; Kydd & Walter, 2006; Nagl et al., 2008).
Distrust of Others

Hermann defines Distrust of Others as “A general feelings of doubt, uneasiness,
misgiving, and weariness about others and an inclination to suspect the motives of others.”
(Hermann, 2005). Leadership trait analysis scores distrust by examining nouns and noun phrases
and how they reference persons other than themselves in terms of doubt, distrust, weariness,
misgivings, uneasiness, and whether that other represents something that is a detriment or an
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agent of harm towards the individual of his or her allies (Hermann, 2005). Distrust of others is
operationalized by coding a noun as being indicative of distrust and then taking the percentage of
times an individual indicates distrust throughout their verbal material (Hermann, 2005).
Individuals with a high level of distrust will are generally suspicious of the actions of
others, often characterizing those actions as competition against their position or ideology
(Hermann, 2005). Individuals with a high level of distrust perceived their position as being a
zero-sum game that leads these individuals to perceive other actors as having systemic ulterior
motives that threaten the power or livelihood of the individual. These individuals will also create
a culture of loyalty by creating an environment in which criticism and dissent can lead to
punishment for the unfortunate subordinate (Hermann, 2005). Finally, these leaders will take
steps to sabotage or disrupt what they perceive as plans to hurt the individuals position or cause
(Hermann, 2005). This trait leads to the fifth hypothesis posited by this study:
H5: As terrorist-leader distrust increases, the lethality of terrorist violence increases.
Individuals who chose to become terrorists are seen as being distrustful of mainstream
political and social forces and their ability to rectify issues pertaining to domination and injustice
(Cottee & Hayward, 2011; Crenshaw, 1981; Greenberg et al., 1990). This distrust drives
individuals into terrorism or terrorist groups because they fear the motives of the institutions
within their political environment (Crenshaw, 1981; Hosking, 2009; Post, 2007). Distrust also
influences terrorist group violence in terms of competition and bargaining. Groups often see the
legalistic approach to conciliation and concession as being empty in gesture and unable to
remedy the inherent distrust a terrorist group harbors towards state institutions (Corsi, 1981;
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Kydd & Walter, 2009). Leaders of terrorist groups who distrust the motivations of a target state
will create violence in an effort to disrupt the ulterior plans of a target state to dismantle the
terrorist group or political movement (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005).
In-group Bias

Hermann defines In-group Bias as “View in which one’s own group (social, political,
ethnic, etc) holds center stage.” (Hermann, 2005). In-group bias represents a strong emotional
attachment to one’s own group and an emphasis on maintain the status of one’s own group
(Hermann, 2005). In-group bias is coded by examining words or phrases that refer to the
individuals own group. If the individual uses modifier words that are favorable to their group or
indicates a need to main group honor and identity, than the phrase is scored for in-group bias.
The trait is operationalized by calculated by taking the percentage of times an individual uses a
phrase that is coded for in-group bias.
Individuals with a high in-group bias will be interested in maintaining a distinct and
separate identity for his or her group (Hermann, 2005). These individuals become concerned
they feel that other groups seek to meddle with the internal affairs of his or her in-group.
Individuals with high in-group bias will also associate the group with being an integral
component of self (Hermann, 2005). These leaders prioritize internal cohesion by creating an
environment where loyalty is an essential component in advancement through the in-group’s
organization structure. Those high in in-group bias will also create external scapegoats for the ingroup’s problems (Hermann, 2005). This creates a highly mobilizing message for in-group
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members that creates aggressive behavior against the out-group enemy (Hermann, 2005). This
trait leads to the sixth and final hypothesis posited by this study:
H6: As terrorist leader in-group bias increases, the lethality of terrorist violence increases.
Individual in-group bias is a precursor for intergroup conflict and terrorist group
violence (Bar‐Tal, 2001; De Dreu et al., 2010). Individuals who decide to join terrorist
organizations have been shown to exhibit higher levels of in-group bias than individuals who
share the same ideological or group affiliation but are not members of terrorist organizations
(Smith, 2008). Leaders’ of terrorist organizations are aware of institutional threats and biases
against their social and political in-groups (Shayo & Zussman, 2011). Terrorist leaders are then
able to make efficient use of perceived and real affronts to the in-group as a mechanism to
mobilize violence against the out-group (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; Navarrete,
Kurzban, Fessler, & Kirkpatrick, 2004).
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METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

As stated at the beginning of this paper, the objective of this study is to examine the
potential effect of terrorist-leader psychology on the lethality of terrorist violence. Using a novel
method of examining the speech of terrorist-leaders to create measurements of their psychology,
it is possible to build a model that now specifies distinct individual-level variables within
empirical models of terrorist-group behavior. This section deals with the elements of research
design and methodology that will be used for three objectives. The first is to create a new source
of data that will contain measurements of terrorist-leadership psychology for terrorist
organizations. The second objective is to detail the operationalization of both lethality
(dependent variable) and psychology (independent variable) while also describing the
operationalization of a variety of controls. The final objective is to describe a comprehensive
statistical model that can be used to test the usefulness and strength of terrorist-leader
psychology in predicting the lethality of violence for terrorist groups.
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Data Collection

The data used in this study comes from three sources to create a new data set. Firstly, two
existing data sets are utilized for this study. The dependent variable comes from the Global
Terrorism Database (LaFree & Dugan, 2004, 2007), an open source data set that provides event
level data for terrorist attacks from 1970 to 2010. 9 The specific data that comes from the GTD
are the annual amount of attacks committed and casualties inflicted by a terrorist organization.
The second source of data is the Big Allied and Dangerous Database, which was created for
studying organizational predictors of group lethality. It contains variables that measure
organizational characteristics such as group capability and group ideology 10. This data is the
foundation for the controls used for this study, as they have shown in the past to be useful in
predicting the lethality of terrorist organizations (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Asal et al., 2009;
Piazza, 2009).
The final source of data comes from terrorist-leader verbal material. This collection is
unique to any previous published data in terrorism studies and utilizes open source primary data
from terrorist organizations. Verbal material for terrorist leaders comes from speeches and public
communiques that were written by either an identifiable leader of a terrorist organization or, in
lieu of no central figurehead, a leadership council. The data is open source and is available in
collected books, academic archives, group websites, or government databases either in print or

9

More information about the Global Terrorism Database can be found at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
More information on the Big Allied and Dangerous Database can be found at
http://www.albany.edu/pvc/data.shtml.
10
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online. Each leader must have at least four thousand words or more collected per year to
confidently have that measurement be included in the analysis. These data are the main source
for creating operational independent variables, which are terrorist leadership psychological
characteristics.
Variable Descriptions and Operationalization
Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis for this study is Terrorist-Group Year. Each group represents a crosssection and each year represents a temporal point. As discussed earlier, this type of data calls for
an estimation procedure that can handle time-series cross-section data 11. The groups included in
this analysis are shown below in Table 1. In total, eleven sub-state terrorist organizations are
represented in the empirical portion of this study. These groups were chosen for both substantive
and practical reasons. The groups, unlike the majority of lesser-known terrorist organizations 12,
have clearly defined leaderships. These groups also have relatively active and public leaders,
which is integral for the collection of verbal material. The issue of adequate verbal material for
the creation of the main independent variables also represents an issue of practicality. These
groups were also chosen because of the abundant verbal material that they produce in
comparison to smaller groups.

11

Not every group will exist at every temporal point from 1991 to 2011 (Example: The LTTE ceased to exist in
2010). This means that some groups will be included more so than others.
12
There is much debate within the terrorist organization literature on the differences between hierarchical and
networked organization structures. Many smaller terrorist-groups do not have a well-defined leadership and depend
more on autonomous cells for operations.
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Table 1 Included Sub-State Terrorist Organizations
Group
Irish
Republican
Army (IRA)

Description

Al-Qae'da
(AQ)

Global militant Islamist and takfiri organization founded by Abdullah Yusuf
Azzam and Osama bin Laden in Peshawar, Pakistan.

Ansar alShari'a

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula , also known as Ansar al-Shari'a ,is a
militant Islamist organization, primarily active in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Basque
Homeland
and Freedom
(ETA)

An armed Basque nationalist and separatist organization. The group was founded in 1959
and has since evolved from a group promoting traditional Basque culture to a paramilitary
group with the goal of gaining independence for the Greater Basque Country.

Liberation
Tigers of
Tamil Eelam
(LTTE)

A separatist militant organization that was based in northern Sri Lanka. Founded in May
1976 by Velupillai Prabhakaran, it waged a secessionist nationalist campaign to create an
independent state in the north and east of Sri Lanka for Tamil people.

Hizbollah

A Shi'a Islamic militant group and political party based in Lebanon. Its paramilitary
wing is regarded as a resistance movement throughout much of the Arab world and
in Shiite communities.

Zapatista
Army of
National
Liberation
(EZLN)

A revolutionary leftist group based in Chiapas, the southernmost state of Mexico

Kurdistan
Workers Party
(PKK)

A Kurdish political and militant organization which fought an armed struggle against the
Turkish state for cultural and political rights and self-determination for the Kurds in
Turkey.

Hamas

The Palestinian Sunni Islamic or Islamist organization, with an associated military wing,
theIzz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, located in the Palestinian territories.

Shining Path
(SL)

A Maoist guerrilla insurgent organization in Peru.

Revolutionary
Armed Forces
of Colombia
(FARC)

A Marxist–Leninist organization involved in the continuing Colombian armed
conflict since 1964.

Irish republican paramilitary organization that seeks to remove Northern Ireland from the
United Kingdom and bring about an independent republic encompassing all of Ireland.
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This leadership, from which the verbal material is taken, is involved in either the public
political operation of a group and/or involved in a military capacity for these organizations. It
should be noted that the number of cross-sections used here is smaller than the typical
quantitative study of terrorist-group lethality. This means that the results are only generalizable
to a specific grouping of terrorist-groups, mostly high-profile and established groups, as opposed
to lesser known and less influential terrorist organizations. The results are also confined to a
temporal range of 1991 to 2011, and may not be representative of the terrorist-group lethality
when examining historical group behavior. While the data collected does rightly have these
limitations, the data is still valuable. These groups represent highly influential sub-state actors in
the realm of both domestic and international terrorism. The groups chosen for this study, while
small in number, show considerable variance in both ideological type, objectives, and violent
behavior over time and space. At the moment, the data used for this study is the most appropriate
for testing hypotheses concerning leader psychology and terrorist-group lethality.

36

Dependent Variable

This study is interested in only the type of violence that would fit a definition of
intentional use, or threat of use of violence, against civilians or non-combatants for a political or
social objective (Sandler & Enders, 2007; Stanton, 2013). Fortunately, the Global Terrorism
Database (GTD) clearly stipulates three attributes and three criteria for an incident to be included
in the data. An incident must have three attributes present for inclusion (LaFree & Dugan, 2007):
(1) The incident was intentional, (2) The incident must entail violence or a threat of violence, (3)
The perpetrators of the incident must be sub-state actors. Alongside these attributes, two of three
criteria must also be met for inclusion: (1) the incident must be aimed at attaining a political,
economic, religious, or social goal (LaFree & Dugan, 2007). (2) There must be evidence of an
intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience than the
immediate victims (LaFree & Dugan, 2007). (3) The incident must be outside the context of
legitimate warfare activities and more particularly, be outside the parameters of standard
humanitarian law when it comes to deliberate targeting of civilians or non-combatants (LaFree &
Dugan, 2007).
The inclusion attributes and criteria of the GTD closely overlap with the definition of
sub-state terrorism accepted by this study. While many of the groups examined by this thesis
may also operate within the context of an insurgency, which means that some groups may
conduct insurgent violence against enemy combatants within the temporal range of this study,
the author has confidence that the dependent variable for this study accurately reflects terrorism
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and not insurgent violence or actions that would constitute legitimate warfare. The mathematical
operationalization for terrorist lethality is a yearly count of fatalities inflicted by a terrorist-group
per year. This operationalization is common in quantitative studies of terrorist-group lethality
(Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Piazza, 2009).
Lethality of Terrorist Violence (DV) = # of Fatalities/Year
The lethality of violence is variable cross-sectionally and temporally dependent on
differences between unique terrorist-groups, and changes over time for each specific group.
Independent Variables

The main independent variables are the six psychological dispositions discusses earlier in
the theory section of this paper. The quantitative measurements of the psychology variables are
created through a program called Profiler Plus. Profiler Plus was created by Social Science
Automation (Lazarevska et al., 2006; Schafer & Walker, 2006) 13. Profiler Plus creates these
psychology variables by examining verbal material taken from terrorist leaders. More
specifically, these variables are coded by the Verbs in Context System (VICS) and the
Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) coding modules (Hermann, 2005; Schafer & Walker, 2006).
Both coding modules analyze the verbal material that is input in Profiler Plus and exports them
to a spreadsheet in Microsoft Access for each document scored and coded.

13

Profiler Plus has a variety of coding schemes but LTA and OpCode were chosen as they have shown
demonstrated usefulness and reliability in examining leaders in international studies topics. Please see
“http://socialscience.net/default.aspx” for more details on Social Science Automation and Profiler Plus.
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The six independent variables are briefly reiterated below 14:
Philosophical Beliefs (P1): What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe
essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political
opponents? (Hostile or Friendly)
Instrumental Beliefs (I1): What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political
action? (Conflict/Cooperation)
Self-Confidence: indicates one’s sense of self-importance, an individual’s image of his or her
ability to cope adequately with objects and persons in the environment around them
Need for Power and Influence: indicates a concern for establishing, maintaining, or restoring
one’s power or, in other words, the desire to control, influence, or have an impact on other
persons or groups
Distrust of Others: a general feeling of doubt, uneasiness, misgiving, and wariness about others-an inclination to suspect the motives and actions of others.
In-Group Bias: indicates a view of the world in which one’s own group holds center stage.

14

For a reminder about the discussion of the coding and operationalization of these psychological dispositions
please refer to pages sixteen through twenty four of this document.
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Control Variables

Capabilities

To give this study internal validity and to take into account other possible explanations
for terrorist group lethality, a number of control variables are used in this study. Terrorism
scholarship has been interested in the effect that both organizational capabilities and ideology
have on behavior of terrorist organizations. Empirical evidence has shown that group lethality
can be correlated with the organizational capabilities of terrorist groups (Asal & Rethemeyer,
2008). This builds off scholarship that promotes the intuitive argument that better capabilities
will cause groups to commit more lethal and higher profile attacks against their targets (Acharya
& Marwah, 2011; Crenshaw, 1987; Frisch, 2012). Because of this emphasis on organizational
capability, the first set of controls come from the capability measurements in the Big Allied and
Dangerous Database . The capability controls are described below.
Organization Size: Ordinal level measurement of group size coded 0 for 0-100 members, 1 for
100-1000 members, 2 for 1000-10,000 members, and 3 for 10,000 or more members.
Territorial Control: Dichotomous measurement coded 1 is a group controls territory and 0 if a
group does not.
Alliance Connections: Interval measurement that measures the number of known alliances a
group has.

40

These controls were chosen as all three were found to be significant predictors of terrorist
attack lethality (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Asal et al., 2009). Groups that have larger
membership sizes, groups that control territory, and groups with a large amount of alliance
connections are expected to show increased lethality in their violent behavior.
Ideology

Another source of control variables for this study comes from evidence that the ideology
of groups also plays a role in determining the lethality of violence these groups commit. Both
qualitative and quantitative scholars have found evidence that ideology may be a mechanism that
increases or decreases the lethality of terrorist violence (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Hoffman,
1995, 2006; Piazza, 2009). The ideological control measurements also come from the data
published by Asal and Rethemeyer and the ideology measurements used are detailed below.
Religious: Dichotomous measurement coded 1 is a group has a religious ideology and coded 0 if
a group does not.
Ethno-Nationalist: Dichotomous measurement coded 1 is a group has a ethno-nationalist
ideology and coded 0 if a group does not.
Leftist: Dichotomous measurement coded 1 if a group has a leftist ideology and coded 0 if a
group does not.
It is expected that religious and ethno-nationalist groups will show increased attack
lethality compared to their leftist counter-parts. Terrorism scholarship has focused on ideological
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differences in terrorist violence and it appears intuitive that religious groups and ethno nationalist
groups are more lethal. Ethno-nationalist groups oftentimes have larger organizations (Hoffman,
2006) that enjoy the support of a broad constituency that makes these groups more lethal. Leftist
groups are thought to have an opposite profile. Leftist groups are generally smaller and do not
target a broad group of people, but will target specific elements of state they oppose (Hoffman,
2006).
Religious groups are unique because it is thought that their ideology is conducive to
frequent high lethality attacks. Their religious orientation creates objectives that are not only
political but also social in nature (Hoffman, 1995). This social component of religious groups
create a need for the complete restructure of society based on changing the religious fabric of
society, and the best way to do this might be to eliminate or coerce the elements of society that
represent social and religious rivalries (Crenshaw, 1986; Hoffman, 1995; Jones, 2013). This
strict black and white view creates a justification for extreme violence that is used to protect the
security of both the group and the broad religious identity.
Method of Analysis

To test the aforementioned hypotheses this study utilizes a statistical experiment. This is
done through a regression analysis utilizing a model of terrorist-leader psychology and group
level control variables. These variables are used to fit a regression equation that represents an
updated model of terrorist group lethality. Because the data is defined as a time-series crosssectional dataset, the regression techniques used must account for the specific issues that come
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with this kind of data. Using this analysis is superior to a normal cross-sectional or time series
analysis in three ways (Beck, 2008; Podestà, 2002). Firstly it increases the number of analyzed
cases and helps alleviate potential small n problems for an exclusively cross sectional or time
series analysis. Secondly, it examines the effect that leadership psychology has on violence
lethality over both time and group instead of only one or the other (Podestà, 2002). Lastly, it
helps to correct for the violations of statistics assumptions in OLS analysis that lead to biased
and inefficient coefficients (Podestà, 2002; Shor, Bafumi, Keele, & Park, 2007).
A final note about the statistical model is that the speech data that is collected per group
year represents a potential endogeneity and simultaneity problem. If the verbal material used to
create measurements of psychology is measured against the lethality data from the same year, it
would be difficult if not impossible to realistically determine the direction of causation. To solve
the endogeneity problem, the verbal material used to create the psychology measurements are
lagged by one year. This means that the psychology of terrorist leadership will affect the lethality
of terrorist violence in the subsequent year. This allows the study to show a clear direction of
causation if a correlation is found between leader psychology and terrorist violence lethality.
The Models

This study will analyze three groupings of regression models to examine different
nuances of terrorist leadership. The first grouping will analyze the entire data set, the second
grouping will separately analyze units that have a singular leader and figurehead for the
organization, and the third grouping will analyze only units that have a leadership council and
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not a singular figurehead for the organization. This is done to examine the potential differences
that a singular leader of a terrorist organization might possess as compared to a group that has
multiple leaders in the same position of authority.
Each grouping will be examined through two rounds of regression analysis. The first round
of equations will be a fully fitted model that uses philosophical belief, the LTA traits, and the
structural control variables:
(1) 𝑌(𝐿𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝑃1) + 𝛽2 (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝛽3 (𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟) +
𝛽4 (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽5 (𝐼𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠) + 𝛽6 (𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) + 𝛽7 (𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦) +

𝛽8 (𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽9 (𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠) + 𝛽10 (𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽11 (𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀

The second round of equations will be a series of fully fitted models but with
instrumental belief, the LTA traits, and the structural control variables:

(2) 𝑌(𝐿𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐼1) + 𝛽2 (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝛽3 (𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟) +
𝛽4 (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽5 (𝐼𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠) + 𝛽6 (𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) + 𝛽7 (𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦) +

𝛽8 (𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽9 (𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽11 (𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝜀

To make sure that the main independent variables in this study are not in overly correlated, a
bivariate correlation analysis was performed and is presented in table 1 below.
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Table 2 Bivariate Correlation Table | N = 104
Variables

In-Group
Bias

Philosophical

Instrumental

Need for Power

Distrust of Others

Philosophical

1

0.2*

-0.27*

-0.32*

-0.08

0.11

Instrumental

0.2*

1

-0.12

-0.48*

0.03

0.03

Need for
Power

-0.27*

-0.12

1

0.39

0.47*

-0.29*

Distrust of
Others

-0.32*

-0.48*

0.39

1

0.12

-0.12

In-Group Bias

-0.08

0.03

0.47*

0.12

1

-0.23*

-0.29*

-0.12

-0.23*

1

SelfConfidence
0.11
0.03
* Denotes a statistically significant correlation

Self-Confidence

None of the independent variables reach above a .5 correlation according to a pairwise
correlation test. As suspected, Philosophical belief and Instrumental belief are significantly
correlated but only show a .2 correlation coefficient. The highest correlations occur between I1
and Distrust, and In-Group Bias and Need for Power, but neither reaches any higher than a .48
correlation coefficient. Collinearity between the independent variables should not be an issue
when estimating the regression models.
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RESULTS

The models were fitted with the above parameters and were estimated with two different
estimation procedures for cross-sectional time-series data. Firstly, fixed effects models were
estimated with only the independent variables of interest. Fixed effects estimation improves upon
standard OLS estimation for pooled cross-sectional time-series data by taking into account
differences across the observations that may not meet OLS assumptions due to the nature of
CSTS data (Beck, 2008; Dielman, 1983; Podestà, 2002; Torres-Reyna, 2009). Fixed Effects
estimation controls for all “time-invariant” predictors that may have an influence on the outcome
variable (culture, religion, government type, etc.).This means that the group level control
variables are not able to be estimated on their own within the fixed effects framework. The
reason that fixed effects are reported here is twofold: (1) The fixed effects results are the easiest
way to examine the direct effect of the independent variable (psychology) on the dependent
(group lethality) by reporting coefficients that are analogous to standard OLS results. (2)
Including fixed effects helps to give this study methodological pluralism by reporting the results
of a commonly used estimation technique in the discipline.
The second estimation procedure performed in this study is hierarchical linear regression,
which is also known as a random effects or multilevel model 15. This estimation procedure, like
fixed effects, helps to correct for potential assumption violations that would occur under normal
OLS estimation. The difference between the two is that the random model allows for the
15

Because this estimation procedure has a variety of correct names, the term Multilevel Model will be used to
indicate this estimation procedure.
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inclusion of time-invariant variables (Podestà, 2002; Shor et al., 2007; Steenbergen & Jones,
2002). This is because the random model allows for the non-independence of observations over
time, but still assumes independence between groups (Beck, 2008; Dielman, 1983; Podestà,
2002). A second advantage of the random model is that it can help account for multiple levels of
effects. It estimates level-1 variables that account for individual-level effects, and level-2
variables that account for group level effects. This is indeed where the “multilevel” portion of the
random model comes from. For this study, level-1 variables are assumed to be the psychological
traits of the terrorist-leader and the level-2 variables are assumed to be the group-level controls.
Another advantage of the random model is that it allows the researcher to examine variance
differences between different groups. Interpretation of the random model estimates is different
from that of fixed effects. Random models take into account both the fixed and between effects
and the independent variable coefficient should be interpreted as the average effect of X over Y
when X changes across time and between observations (Torres-Reyna, 2009).
Before reporting the results of the models, two tests were conducted to examine potential
mathematical problems that are common in CSTS data. These three problems are
heteroskedasticy, andautocorrelation of the error terms 16, and contemporaneous correlation.
These issues often bias the standard errors, which results in incorrect hypothesis testing
outcomes (Beck, 2008; Podestà, 2002; Torres-Reyna, 2009). The model was tested for
heteroskedasticity by using a modified wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity 17. The wald
test indicated hetereoskedasticity in the data by rejecting the null hypothesis of

16
17

Autocorrelation is also known as Serial Correlation.
The test was carried out in Stata using the xttest3 command.
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homosekedasticity (p = 0.00). The second test was for autocorrelation, which uses the
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data. 18 The results of the Wooldridge test indicated
that there is first-order autocorrelation (p = 0.00) within the data. To correct for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, group clustered standard errors were used for hypothesis
testing. Group clustered standard errors produce a standard error estimate that is robust to both
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and are often used in economics and finance panel data
sets (Petersen, 2009; Torres-Reyna, 2009; Wooldridge, 2003). The final problem,
contemporaneous correlation, is problematic for models with large time components (T > 30),
and should not pose a problem for this study.
The results portion of this study contains five sections. The first section displays
summary statistics and bivariate fixed effects regressions. The second section reports the results
of the regression analyses for the entire dataset. The third section reports the results of the
different leader groupings (single leader vis a vis leadership council). The fourth section reports
the results of a variety of robustness checks by re-estimating the models without Al-Qaeda’s
September 11th data. The fifth and final section then examines substantive group level
differences for I1 and Distrust by examining random slope parameters and reporting the
Empirical Bayes Estimate for the group level variance of I1/Distrust for individual terroristorganizations.

18

The test was carried out in Stata using the xtserial command.
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Summary Statistics and Bivariate Models
Table 3 Summary Statistics | N = 104

Variable
Lethality

Mean
140.71

Standard Deviation
364.83

Min
0

Max
2996

Philosophical Belief (P1)

0.04

0.23

-1

1

Instrumental Belief (I1)

0.23

0.41

-1

1

Need for Power and
Influence

0.31

0.11

0.09

0.57

Distrust of Others

0.28

0.15

0

0.74

In-Group Bias

0.18

0.09

0

0.46

Self-Confidence

0.18

0.19

0

1

Territory

0.78

0.41

0

1

Alliances

6.4

10.4

0

33

Organization Size

2.03

0.81

1

3

Religious

0.28

0.45

0

1

Ethnic/Separatist

0.42

0.49

0

1

Leftist

0.33

0.47

0

1

Table 3 above shows the summary statistics for the variables used in this study. This
includes mean, standard deviation, and the range of each variable. Table 4 below shows simple
bivariate correlations using fixed effects and cluster robust standard errors to correct for
heteroskedasticity and serial correlations.
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Table 4 Bivariate Fixed Effects Models for Main Independent Variables | N = 104

Variable
Philosophical Beliefs (P1)
Instrumental Beliefs (I1)
Need for Power and
Influence
Distrust of Others
In-Group Bias
Self-Confidence

Coefficient
-146.06
-82.78

T-Statistic
-0.77
-2.8

P Value
0.461
0.01

R^2
0.03
0.04

-386.4
205.21
-437.15
258.11

-1.84
0.92
-1.25
1.72

0.09
0.38
0.23
0.11

0.01
0.07
0.01
0.01

The simple bivariate models show support for only the instrumental beliefs (strategic)
hypothesis. The only other variable that approaches statistical significance is Need for Power,
although, not with the hypothesized coefficient direction. The rest of the main independent
variables show no significance in a bivariate fixed effects model.
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Overall Results 19
Table 5 Fixed Effects Models (Fatality Dependent Variable) | N=104
Variable
Philosophical

Model(1)

Model(2)

-153.26 (204.9)

Instrumental

-97.09 (45.2)*

Need for
Power

-303.31 (181.4)

-197.87 (151.5)

Distrust

270.9 (270.9)

207.58 (257.6)

In-Group Bias
SelfConfidence

-329.14 (345.3)

-393.4 (410.1)

219.17 (168.8)

217.09 (159.03)

Constant

186.58 (110.4)

202.85 (154.3)

1.87

4.19 **

F Stat

0.05
0.04
Overall R^2
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses | *** p <0 .01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

The fixed effect models in Table 5 only show one significant predictor, which was
Instrumental Belief. The coefficient shows the correct direction and was significant at the ten
percent level. None of the other main independent variables show significance, which could be
an indicator that the assumptions of fixed effects do not adequately capture the influence of the
group in estimating the effect of psychology on terrorist lethality.

19

All models were estimated in Stata using the xtreg command for fixed effects models and the xtmixed command
for random models.
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Table 6 Multilevel Models (Fatality Dependent Variable) | N=104
Variable

Philosophical

Model(3)

Model(4)

-178.24
(157.31)

Model(5)
-175.42
(203.7)

-122.38
(45.17)**

Instrumental

Model(6)

-115.47
(43.67)***

-92.85
(396.35)

51.82
(161.13)

-127.35
(174.17)

-11.51
(116.55)

Distrust

663.97
(260.55)**

590.99
(206.77)***

337.03
(169.05)**

241.12
(245.22)

In-Group Bias

101.61
(427.134)

75.61
(133.91)

-95.44
(362.25)

-173.57
(417.65)

Self-Confidence

224.82
(188.48)

221.3
(152.17)

213.18
(144.30)

213.85
(133.53)

Territory

318.24
(134.64)**

329.12
(143.76)**

Organization Size

-65.06
(27.47)**

-76.5
(31.52)**

Alliances

9.91
(1.61)***

5.79
(1.85)***

-20.05
(56.08)

-2.63
(64.04)

237.28
(132.62)*

251.97
(141.7)*

Need for Power

Religious Dummy

Ethnic/Separatist Dummy

-184.27
Constant
-70.59
-67.14
(61.55)***
-755.88
-755.85
-751.86
Log pseudolikelihood
11.46**
82.47***
1214.29***
Wald Chi^2
995.06
530.41
5.70e-14
Var(Con)
119427.2
119792.3
111410.9
Var(Residual)
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses | *** p <0 .01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

-145.04
(65.82)**
-751.82
1639.11***
4.34e-14
111333.6

Table 6 shows the results of the random models. The first two models only contained the
main psychology variables. I1 was once again an important predictor by displaying the correct
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direction in the coefficient alongside statistical significance. I1 met the mainstream conservative
significance level of five percent. A second predictor of note was that of Distrust, showing
significance in both models 3 and 4. Distrust showed the hypothesized direction and significance
in every model except for the fully specified Instrumental model. Another result of these two
models is that of the role of Philosophical Belief and Instrumental Belief. It seems that
Instrumental Belief is a much better indicator of terrorist-group lethality. Measurements of
model fit (Log psuedolikelihood and Wald Chi2) both show better model fit than Philosophical
Belief. The random intercept (Var(con)), which indicates the amount of group specific explained
variance in the dependent variable, also considerably decreased from the Philosophical model to
the Instrumental model. This indicates that Instrumental Belief contributes much more to
explaining the variance of terrorist-group lethality.
Models 5 and 6 in Table 6 estimate the fully specified models that contain important
control variables. As expected, the group level controls showed significant influence on grouplethality. More importantly, Instrumental Belief was once again significant when controlling for
group level variables. It again showed the hypothesized direction with a substantively large
effect on group-lethality (-115.47). Distrust retained significance in the Philosophical Belief
model, but lost significance in the Instrumental Belief model. Distrust, when significant, also
retained the hypothesized direction and a substantively large effect (337.03) on group lethality.
The effect of Distrust, while still large, did show a sharp drop in the coefficient when controlling
for group level predictors. Model fit measurements (pseudologlikliehood and Wald Chi2) also
indicated that the inclusion of group level controls greatly improved model fit. The random
intercept component (Var(con)) for the model also indicated that the inclusion of group level
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(level-2) variables greatly increased the amount of explained variance within the dependent
variable. In terms of the independent variables of interest, both fixed effects and multilevel
models suggest that as a leader’s instrumental (strategic) beliefs become more competitive, the
lethality of group violence also increases. The multilevel models also somewhat suggest that as a
leader become more distrustful, the violence of group violence will increase as well.
Leader Type Grouping Results
Table 7 Fixed Effects Models (Fatality Dependent Variable) | Leader (N=61), Leadership Council (N=43)

Variable

Philosophical
Leader
Model

Philosophical
Belief

-590.87
(150.41)***

Philosophical
Leadership Council
Model

Instrumental
Leader
Model

Instrumental
Leadership Council
Model

14.02
(19.28)

Instrumental
Belief

-97.34
(73.83)

3.97
(7.61)

Need for
Power

-602.33
(278.47)*

110.2
(62.10)

-397.85
(358.59)

105.47
(52.9)*

Distrust

637.8
(390.25)

37.08
(77.29)

499.62
(399.23)

25.6
(87.58)

In-Group Bias

-605.1154
(560.05)

19.33
(67.08)

-634.17
(618.27)

18.36
(62.13)

SelfConfidence

631.2
(335.19)*

19.53
(11.83)

543.34
(240.96)*

18.59
(13.97)

Constant

193.93
(267.05)

-25.44
(38.00)

198.01
(311.92)

-21.77
(35.34

F Stat

10.89***

88.94***

8.05***

8.31***

0.13
0.12
0.07
R^2
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses | *** p <0 .01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

0.12

Table 7 reports the results of the fixed effects models for groups with both singular
leadership and leadership councils. Only the Philosophical singular leadership model shows a
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high degree of significant predictors. Philosophical Belief, Need for Power, and Self-Confidence
all show some level statistical significance in the Philosophical leader model. Philosophical
Belief shows the hypothesized direction, while Self-Confidence does not. Need for Power shows
the opposite direction, but only displays weak significance. This change in direction could be due
to the fact that leaders who hold singular leadership and have a high need for power and
influence are more interested in internal affairs such as their leadership status and group structure
than increasing the lethality of terrorist violence.
For the Instrumental models, Instrumental Belief show no statistical significance, but
Self-Confidence (Singular Leadership) and Need for Power (Leadership Council) do show weak
significance with the hypothesized directions. Self-Confidence is weakly significant in both of
the singular leader models, albeit in the opposite of the hypothesized direction. This might
indicate that the initial intuitions about the role of terrorist-leader self-confidence on the lethality
of group violence may be more indicative of the general role of self-confidence on radicalization
and violence (Bar‐Tal, 2001; Pyszczynski et al., 2008), and not necessarily the role of leader
self-confidence in determining group lethality. In fact, the result in Table 7 may actually be more
intuitive than the hypothesized effect. The increase in group lethality with higher singular leader
self-confidence may actually be evidence of observed terrorist behavior from other studies.
Leaders with high self-confidence may increase the lethality of violence because they have more
confidence in the efficacy of their group’s violent behavior on extracting concessions from a
target government or group (Crenshaw, 1986, 2007).
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Table 8 shows the results of the random models amongst singular leadership and
leadership councils. Philosophical Belief is statistically significant in the singular leadership
model, but not the leadership council model. The coefficient for Philosophical Belief also
displays the hypothesized coefficient direction. Instrumental Belief also shows significance only
in the singular leadership model and not the leadership council model. Instrumental Belief has
the hypothesized coefficient direction with a large substantive effect. Distrust again shows
statistical significance, but only in the singular leader models. Distrust continues to have the
hypothesized coefficient direction alongside having statistical significance. Lastly, SelfConfidence does show weak significance in the Philosophical leadership council model and
Instrumental singular leadership model. The direction is again the opposite of the hypothesized
effect of self-confidence on group lethality.
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Table 8 Multilevel Models (Fatality Dependent Variable) | Leader (N=61), Leadership Council (N=43)

Variable
Philosophical Belief

Philosophical
Leader
Model
-555.01
(177.27)***

Philosophical
Leadership Council
Model
16.64
(19.37)

Instrumental Belief

Instrumental
Leader
Model

Instrumental
Leadership Council
Model

-110.49
(44.68)**

-5.16
(12.96)
107.37
(49.16)**

Need for Power

-67.34
(273.27)

112.14
(61.1)*

227.01
(301.23)

Distrust

1293.91
(330.91)***

46.88
(83.49)

1152.7
(283.04)***

29.5
(89.82)

In-Group Bias

-514.95
(428.03)

12.41
(12.41)

-475.37
(362.03)

2.38
(57.15)

Self-Confidence

539.96
(346.96)

20.5
(11.02)*

447.67
(269.71)*

16.88
(12.44)

-169.68
(168.38)

-17.72
(32.14)

-199.44
(126.97)

-6.43
(29.82)

-454.87

-215.14

-456.59

-215.39

Constant
Log
Psuedolikelihood
Wald Chi^2

78.66

36.77

112.39

51.4

Var(Con)

4.06e-14

845.54

9.21e-22

843.3

175637.6
987.93
185824.5
Var(Residual)
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses | *** p <0 .01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

1001.61

In terms of the overall influence of the psychological dispositions of leaders on terroristgroup lethality, the random model shows interesting differences between singular leaders and
leadership councils. The models that examine statements made by singular leaders show better
model fit results when examining log psuedolikelihood and Wald Chi Squared. The variance
component of the random intercept (Var(Con)) shows that the psychology variables better
explain the variance in group lethality when the statements are taken from a singular leader than
from a leadership council. This seems intuitive because singular leaders should have more power
over their organization and thus their psychological dispositions should have more influence over
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the group behavior that they sanction. For groups with single leaders, as both Philosophical
Belief and Instrumental Belief become less competitive in nature, the group’s violence become
less lethal. In terms of personality traits, when singular leaders become more distrustful, the
group’s lethality increases. For the models that examined groups with leadership councils, only
need for power showed consistent significance. As a leadership council’s need for power and
influence increased, so did the group’s violence.
Unfortunately, due to the smaller population sizes due to splitting the data between
singular leadership and leadership councils, it is impossible to fit models with the group level
control variables without over-fitting the equation 20. An interesting difference between
leadership types may also be present when examining group level capabilities and ideology. A
series of random models were estimated using only the group level controls for each of the
leadership types. The random intercepts showed that group level controls (capabilities and
ideology) explained more of the variance in terrorist-group lethality when the groups had a
leadership council as opposed to a singular leader 21. This finding is consistent with the results of
the models that examined the psychological dispositions above. It would seem that groups with
leadership councils are better characterized by group level variables such as ideology and group
capabilities, and groups with a singular leadership show more influence by that individual leader
and their subsequent psychological disposition on group lethality.
20

Stata reports a non-existent Wald Chi Squared for model fit, which is an indicator of over-fitting in the estimated
model.
21
The results for the pure group level models are not shown in this paper for two reasons. Firstly, until more
observations can be collected, it will be difficult to fit a fully specified model without over-fitting. The conclusion
about the substantive differences between leadership types should be considered preliminary. Second, the objective
of this paper is to test hypotheses concerning psychological beliefs and traits, and a more nuanced look into the
complex relationship between leadership type, group level variables, and individual variables is better examined on
its own or in a broader paper.
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Robustness Test

If you surveyed a random sample of Americans on what they believe to be the most
defining moment in the history of terrorism, it probably would not be a surprise to get a large
portion of responses that indicated the September 11th attacks by Al-Qae’da. There have been
nearly two hundred thousand documented terrorist attacks since 1970 (LaFree & Dugan, 2004),
yet the 9-11 attacks remain salient in the collective memory of the planet. In terms of
econometric modeling, it may be possible that the September 11th attacks could be influencing
the results of the models presented in this study. In a study by James Piazza, he found that AlQae’da and Al-Qae’da affiliates may be unique groups that represent outlying cases when
studying terrorist-organization lethality (Piazza, 2009). Piazza discovered that previous empirical
studies, which found that religious groups were more lethal than groups of other ideologies, were
probably influenced by Al-Qae’da and that after controlling for Al-Qae’da; religious
organizations were no more violent than other types of groups (Piazza, 2009).
This section shows the results of multilevel models that are analogous to the models
presented in Table 4, except for the removal of the 2001 Al-Qae’da observation. The total
fatality count in the data is a total of 15,057, with the 2001 Al-Qae’da observation counting for
nearly twenty percent (2,992) of the total. This observation is also nearly three times as much as
the next highest observation (LTTE 1991, 1041 fatalities). Table 7 reports the results of the multilevel
models estimated without the 2001 Al-Qae’da observation.

The results of the models in Table 9 are similar to the original fully specified multilevel
models. Distrust is no longer significant in the fully specified Instrumental model, but retains
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significance in the fully specified Philosophical model. Distrust also has the hypothesized
coefficient direction with a large substantive effect. Instrumental Belief again shows significance
in both the pure psychology and fully specified models. The coefficient also shows the
hypothesized direction. The group level control variables retain some expected levels of
significance, but they show overall less statistical significance 22 when removing the 2001 AlQae’da observation. As with the overall models, the results shows that as instrumental (strategic
beliefs) becomes more competitive the group’s violence increases. Distrust again shows limited
support, meaning that as a leader becomes more distrustful, the group’s lethality increases.

22

Degree of Alliance Connections loses all significance when dropping the 2001 Al-Qae’da observation. This could
be because Al-Qae’da often represents the archetypical networked/connected terrorist organization.
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Table 9 Multilevel Models (Fatality Dependent Variable) | Al-Qae’da 2001 removed. | N=103
Variable

Philosophical Belief

Model(1)

Model(2)

13.88
(110.48)

Model(3)
-4.98
(119.85)

-73.51*
(39.97)

Instrumental Belief

Model(4)

-101.29**
(46.60)

Need for Power

-119.85
(147.47)

-87.52
(161.13)

-10.94
(165.69)

61.03
(120.89)

Distrust

342.07**
(159.16)

239.63
(183.77)

252.98**
(101.29)

128.81
(156.57)

In-Group Bias

-269.49
(200.52)

-320.12
(230.39)

-260.33
(310.06)

-316.64
(356.12)

Self-Confidence

122.86
(106.46)

120.97
(106.72)

119.92
(98.43)

120.72
(98.80)

294.18**
(126.11)

310.92**
(128.72)

Organization Size

-49.43
(34.22)

-57.35*
(34.33)

Alliances

.53
(2.56)

-.88
(2.41)

Religious Dummy

-40.54
(62.91)

-9.12
(68.13)

Ethnic/Separatist Dummy

204.90
(136.61)

242.53*
(139.28)

Territory

68.67
114
-132.86
Constant
(78.21)
(81.65)
(81.55)
-694.1
-693.25
-690.86
Log pseudolikelihood
31.14***
59.52***
1232.94***
Wald Chi^2
12773.59
13334.97
1801.81
Var(Con)
36206.53
35436.37
37769.33
Var(Residual)
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses | *** p <0 .01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

-97.69*
(58.51)
-689.35
1208.11***
747.00
37410.24

The model fit statistics show similar results by indicating that the model fit
(Pseudologliklihood and Wald Chi Squared) improves with the control variables, and more
specifically the inclusion of the Instrumental Belief variable in the fully specified model. The
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variance component of the group level random intercepts (Var(Con)) again indicate that group
level variables helps to explain a larger portion of the variance in group lethality. Again, the fully
specified model with the inclusion of instrumental belief explains most of the variance in
terrorist-group lethality.
Group Level Differences

The models reported above have so far reported the results for hypothesis testing
purposes. It is clear that the instrumental beliefs and the level of distrust displayed by terroristleaders play a role in how violent their organizations will be. This section seeks to complement
the hypothesis testing by examining group level differences for both instrumental beliefs and
leader distrust. This is done by utilizing Empirical Bayes Estimates for the random slope
estimation for both I1 and Distrust of Others. Empirical Bayes Estimates calculate random
intercepts and slopes and can be used to display how they vary across units of analysis
(Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). They are often used to create priors for the Empirical Bayes (EB)
method of data analysis, which is a variant of traditional Bayesian data analysis. The results of
the Empirical Bayes Estimates for the random slopes for Instrumental Belief and Distrust are
displayed in Figures 2 and 3 23. The graphs of the Empirical Bayes Estimates are interpreted by
reading left to right. Slopes graphed on the left hand side of the graph show the least influence of
the psychology variable on a group’s lethality, and slopes graphed on the right hand side of the
graph show the most influence of a psychology variable on a group’s lethality.

23

The Empirical Bayes Estimates were calculated and graphed in Stata.
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Empirical Bayes Estimates for Instrumental Beliefs
Irish Republican Army (IRA)
Hizballah
Ansar al-Shari'a
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
Al-Qae'da
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Zapatista National Liberation Army
Hamas
Shining Path (SL)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
-2.0e-14

-1.0e-14

0
Random Slopes for I1

1.0e-14

2.0e-14

Figure 2 Group Specific Empirical Bayes Estimates for Instrumental Belief

The estimates for instrumental beliefs show considerable variance in the random slopes
across groups. The leader for the LTTE (Velupillai Prabhakaran) shows the highest influence of
I1 on his group’s lethality. In fact, Prabhakaran’s instrumental beliefs are by far the most salient
case of instrumental beliefs in the population of organizations examined in this study.
Qualitatively this should not be surprising as the conflict in Sri Lanka between the LTTE and the
Sinhalese-dominated government was observed as being particularly brutal (Becker, 2004; de
Jong et al., 2002). Prabhakaran expressed the view that militant actions would be the only way to
gain self-governance for the Tamil people in Sri Lanka, and personally oversaw highly lethal
programs such as the Tiger suicide bomb units. The Irish Republican Army (IRA Army
Council) shows the lowest influence of a leader’s strategic beliefs on their group’s lethality. This
too may not be surprising when looking at the temporal range of the data examined. By 1991 and
onward, the IRA had ended large scale campaigns for terrorist violence. Suspected current and
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former leaders of the IRA such as Gerry Adams were beginning to involve themselves more in
the political process as opposed to continuing systematic political violence.
Empirical Bayes Estimates for Distrust of Others
Zapatista National Liberation Army
Shining Path (SL)
Hizballah
Hamas
Irish Republican Army (IRA)
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
Ansar al-Shari'a
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Al-Qae'da
-200

-100

0
Random Slopes for Distrust

100

200

Figure 3 Group Specific Empirical Bayes Estimates for Distrust

The Empirical Bayes Estimates for leader distrust shows less variance between certain
terrorist-organizations. There appears to be some groupings in leadership distrust. The LTTE
(Prabhakaran) and Al-Qae’da (Osama bin Laden) show the highest levels of distrust being an
influence on group lethality. These results are not surprising as both leaders were often
characterized as having displayed elements of paranoia and deep distrust of enemies from within
and outside their organizations. The EZLN (sub-commandante Marcos) and the Shining Path
(Guzman, and later a leadership council) show the lowest influence of leadership distrust on
group lethality. The results for Marcos and Guzman are also not surprising as both leaders were
commonly associated with civilians and non-members of their respective organizations, and did
not exhibit extreme outward paranoia nor did they take great steps to hide their whereabouts
from the average person like Bin Laden and Prabahakran did. Al-Qae’da in the Arabian
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Peninsula and the FARC create another similar grouping that forms the second highest influence
of leader distrust on group lethality, and the PKK, ETA, IRA, Hamas, and Hezbollah form
another similar grouping that represents the middle to lower end of influence of distrust on group
lethality.

CONCLUSION
The results of the empirical analysis performed for this study show that elements of
terrorist-leader psychology do matter. Specifically, a leader’s instrumental (strategic) beliefs and
their personal distrust of others are significant predictors of increased group lethality during the
next year. Statistically, the models that had both I1 and Distrust of Others alongside a series of
group-level control variables, performed the best in both model fit, and explained the most
variance in group lethality per year. These results held for the overall analysis, as well as the
check for robustness, which removed the September 11 attacks from the dataset. Slightly
different results were found when examining the differences between groups with singular
leaders and groups with leadership councils. Instrumental Beliefs, Philosophical Beliefs, and
Distrust of Others remained statistically significant in the multi-level models that used only
groups with singular leaders, but were not significant in the models that used groups with
leadership councils. This means that groups with singular leadership may be more susceptible to
the whims of their leader’s psychological dispositions than to the whims of a collective
psychological disposition of a leadership council.
When examining the individual groups that were included in this study, there is also
considerable heterogeneity in the influence of the significant psychological variables on terrorist65

group lethality. Some groups are more influenced by a leader’s strategic orientation or a leader’s
distrust than others when it comes to group violence. This fact, while unsurprising, raises
interesting questions for future empirical study of terrorist-leader psychology, and with other
dependent variables, it may be that other psychological dispositions are important for groups that
engage in other forms of activity such as kidnapping, smuggling, joining the political process,
etc.
This thesis has been an exercise in both intellectual and substantive growth for the author.
The total N for this study comes to a humble one hundred and four observations of terroristleader statements. The collection of terrorist-leader statements will not end with this study, but
will continue to grow into a larger database. Hopefully this exercise will result in a dataset that
will not only be used to answer my own questions, but can be used to promote theoretical and
methodological growth by helping other scholars within terrorism studies answer questions
concerning terrorist psychology. With a larger dataset, this project will be improved as well. In
the future a Bayesian hierarchical framework will be applied to the questions asked here.
Empirical terrorism studies fit well in to the Bayesian framework, by allowing researchers to
incorporate previous substantive knowledge about group behavior into hypothesis testing 24.
Alongside this approach, there are still more questions to be asked about the role of terroristleaders in predicting group behavior. Future questions include issues of bargaining and
concessions between states and terrorist-organizations, the interaction of ideology and the

24

This includes previous attacks, fatalities, characteristics of groups, possible changes in the psychological
dispositions of terrorist-leaders.
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psychological characteristics of leaders, the heterogeneity of psychology amongst terroristleaders, and even case studies about the decisions of leaders over time.
The main objective of this study was to investigate the role in which terrorist-leader
psychology influences the violent behavior of terrorist-organizations, but it was also an attempt
to compliment and progress current empirical research on terrorist-group violence. The results
shown here contain two main points about terrorist-group lethality. The first is that leader
psychology, and more specifically instrumental beliefs and level of distrust, is a salient factor
when examining terrorist-group lethality as a dependent variable. The second point is that the
predictors of terrorist-group lethality are more complex than a standard assessment of terroristorganization material capabilities or even the utilization of simplistic assumptions about the
nature of extremist ideologies. This is not to say that group level variables do not matter or are
not important predictors of group violence. In-fact, group level predictors were consistently
significant and helped to explain a large portion of the variance in terrorist-group lethality. The
results only clarify that extremist behavior is more complex than pure group-level characteristics,
as many terrorism-studies scholars probably know already.
What terrorist-leaders say to the outside world matters a great deal. When leaders say
they view competitive (violent) strategies as the way towards gaining objectives, their group’s
violent behavior reflects that belief. Leaders who exhibit distrust in their statements will also
promote increased lethality in their group’s violence. These results would probably seem rather
intuitive to scholars of psychology within terrorism-studies, but the method used here allows for
an objective way to examine those beliefs. This means that examination of patterns in terrorist-
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group behavior as predicted by leader statements could be a fruitful program for those interested
in a variety of issues within counter-terrorism and mainstream terrorism-studies. What may be
more important though, is that those in positions of power should listen to the leaders of these
groups. Unfortunately, by the nature of conflicts that involve extremist violence, much of what
these groups say is suppressed or destroyed. This study does not make normative statements
about possible solutions to political violence, but it is clear that governments may benefit from
listening to what these groups have to say. Stopping terrorist campaigns and ending terroristorganizations is a complex issue that may have multiple solutions dependent on a variety of
factors, and learning about the individuals who make organizational decisions should be a salient
part of finding that solution.
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